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Keywords - -Nash  equilibrium, Berge equilibrium, S-system, (S,R,M)-system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The concepts of Nash and Berge equilibria were introduced and studied in many books and 
papers, [1-7], for example. In an earlier work [1], Radjef developed an appealing case of Berge 
equilibrium. Existence theorems as well as relationships between Berge and Nash equilibria were 
explored in [4], using some classical theorems, including the theorem of Tychonoff. In this paper, 
we show a technique for generalizing those results by means of an important fixed-point theorem 
from nonlinear analysis. Several i l lustrative xamples demonstrate the theory, while presenting 
its uti l ity in Euclidean spaces. 
Recall that  a game F is a triplet (I, gti, J~), where I is the set of players, ~t~ and Ji are the set of 
feasible strategies and the payoff functional of the ith player. Ji is defined on the set ~ = 1-[~i ~i. 
The set I - {i} will be denoted by - i ,  while each element of ~ti will be written as ui. Also, 
argmax(u_~) = {u~ e ~:  Ji(u~,u-i) = va4(u - i )} ,  
where 
va4(u_~) = max{J i (u i ,u_~) :  ui 6 ~}. 
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DEFINITION 1.1. Let R -~ {Rm}m6M be a partition of I and let S = (Sm}m6M be subsets of I. 
A feasible strategy (z is an equilibrium point for F for the set R relative to the set S if 
Jr~(~)>_Jr,~(us~,~z-s~), VrmERm,  VuCnandanyf ixedm.  
Throughout his paper, an equilibrium point for F for the set _R relative to the set S will be 
referred to as an equilibrium of [5]. Of special interest is the situation when both the sets R 
and S are {(i}, i c I}. The point ~ is then called a Nash equilibrium [6]. 
DEFINITION 1.2. Let I be an indexed set, finite or infinite. Let S = {Si}ieI be a family of 
nonempty pairwise distinct sets such that I = UieI  si. Then S is said to be an S-system for F 
if for each i E I, argmaxi(u_&) is nonempty. 
DEFINITION 1.3. Let I be an indexed set, finite or infinite. Let R = {Rm}meM be a partition 
of I and S = {Srn}mGM be a set of pairwise disjoint sets, such that I = Uiel  Si. I f  we have the 
following; 
(i) argmaxr~(u_s~) is nonempty for any m and for each rm E Rm, 
! (ii) argmax~.~(u_s~) = argmax~, (u_s~) for any m and Vr,~, r~ 6 R,~. 
Then the game F is said to have an (S, R, M)-system. 
Two theorems will be used throughout his paper. The following theorem will be referred to 
as the Arino-Gautier-Penot fixed-point heorem. 
THEOREM 1.1. (See [8].) Let E be a metrizable locally convex topological vector space and 
let C be a weakly compact convex subset of E. Then any weakly sequentially continuous map f 
from C into C has a fixed point. 
The following theorem is stated in [2] as a corollary of Berge's maximum theorem [5]. 
THEOREM 1.2. (See [2].) Let X and Y be Hausdorff topological spaces. Let T : X --* Y be a 
continuous multifunction with nonempty images, and let f : X x Y -~ R be a continuous function. 
Then the multifunction M : X --~ Y given by M(x)  = arg maxyeT(x ) f (x ,  y) is continuous on X 
if for any x E X ,  M(x)  is a singleton. 
2. EX ISTENCE OF NASH EQUIL IBRIA 
In this section, the above theorems will be applied to the noncooperative game. Notice that 
the assumptions are quite weak, when compared to those made in [6,7]. 
THEOREM 2.1. Let {Ei}ieI be an indexed family, finite or infinite, of metrizable locally convex 
topological vector spaces. For each i 6 I, let f~i be a nonempty convex and weakly compact 
subset of Ei such that: 
(i) J~ is continuous on ~ = rxie i  ~i ,  
(ii) argmaxi(u_i )  is a singleton for each u_~ in f~_i. 
Then F has a Nash equilibrium. 
PROOF. From (i), (ii), and by Theorem 1.2, we conclude that the set valued mapping argmax~ : 
f~-~ ~ f~i is continuous. Since f~i is weakly compact, we have f~i -- ~i in the space (E~,~-i), 
where ~'~ is the weak topology of E~; therefore, the mapping argmaxi  is weakly sequentially 
continuous. 
Now, consider the mapping ~r defined from f~ into itself by U(u) = ~ez  argmaxi(u_~). 
We observe that 0 is weakly sequentially continuous as the composition and the Cartesian 
product of weakly sequentially continuous functions. Also, we know according to [6] that & is a 
Nash equilibrium of F if and only if g is a fixed point of U. By Theorem 1.1, the mapping U- has 
a fixed point, and such a fixed point is a Nash equilibrium. This completes the proof. | 
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EXAMPLE 2.1. Consider the game of two players in which ui C [-1, 1] for i = 1, 2. 
J1 (u) -- -u l  2 + u2, 
y2(u)  : U l  - 
In this game argmaxi (u_ i )  : {0} and argmax2(u_2) = {0}. Also 0(~) = ~ if and only if 
: (0, 0), and thus, ~ : (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium for the game. 
3. EX ISTENCE OF  BERGE EQUIL IBR IA  
Equilibria of Berge type are less well developed than those of Nash, but still they have great 
potential for modeling human behavior or the behavior of firms or institutions in competition. 
Utilizing Berge equilibria, one may model types of "manipulative" behavior, in which the deci- 
sions of another player are optimized by the manipulator player for their own utility maximization. 
Once again, the very weak assumptions allow for a wide applicability. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let I be an indexed set, finite or infinite. Let {Ei}~/  be a family ofmetrizable 
locally convex topological vector spaces. Let the set S : {S i} ioE i  be an S-system for the game F 
and for each i E I, let f~i be a nonempty convex and weakly compact subset of Ei such that 
( i )  y ,  i s  cont inuous  on = 1-i, x 
(ii) argmax~(u_s,)  is a singleton for each u-s~ in t2_s,. 
Then F has a Berge equilibrium. 
PROOF. As in the proof of Theorem 2.1, the set valued mapping argmax~ : t2_s~ -+ t2s~ is 
weakly sequentially continuous. Since the elements of S are nonempty, pairwise distinct and 
cover the set I of indices, there exists S' = {S~}~ei such that S~ is a singleton for each i E I 
and I = [-JieI S~. Then S' defines a one-to-one function g on I such that for each i C I ,  we have 
g(i) e 
Now consider the mapping ~r defined from fl into itself by 
The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.1 shows that the mapping D has a fixed 
point, which is a Berge equilibrium for F. The proof is complete. | 
EXAMPLE 3.1. Consider the game of three players in which ui E [-1, 1] for i = 1, 2, 3 
Jl( ) : 
Y2( ) : -U l  - 
: 
Let Si : {3}, $2 = {1, 2}, and $3 = {1}. Define g by g(1) = 3, g(2) : 2, and g(3) = 1. Then 
Pr ojn~(i) arg mlax(u_s ~) : {0}, 
Pr ojn,(2) arg m2ax(u_s 2) : {0}, 
Pr ojn~(~) arg m3ax(u_s 3) : {0}. 
Therefore, this game has an S-system. Also, Cr(~) = ~ if and only if 5 -- (0, 0, 0), and thus, 
: (0, 0, 0) is Berge equilibrium. 
THEOREM 3.2. Let I be an indexed set, finite or infinite. Let {E{}{ex be a family of metrizable 
locally convex topological vector spaces. Let the set S : {Si}{e/ be an S-system for the game F 
and for each i E I, let 9i  be a nonempty convex and weakly compact subset of Ei such that: 
(i) Yi is continuous on ~ : rLe i  ~i, 
(ii) F has an (S, R, M)-system, 
(iii) argmax~.~(u_s~) is a singleton for each m, any rm E Rm and u-s~ in ~-s,~. 
Then F has a Berge equilibrium. 
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PROOF.  The  same argument  as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that the set valued mapp ing  
argmaxr~ : ~-$~ -~ ~sm is weakly  sequentially continuous. F rom Condit ion (ii), we  deduce 
l 
that  there is a partit ion S t of I such  that for each  given m and  any  rm,  r m C Rm,  we have  the 
following equality: 
Proj~s, ~ (a rgmax(u_s~)~ = ProJ~s, (argmax(u_s~)~ . 
Let 0- be a mapping for ~ into itself such that 
U Pr°J~s, (argmax(u_s~)), 0- (u )  = 
rnEM ~ \ rm 
where for each rn,r,~ is the only representative of the elements of Rm. Like in the proof of 
Theorem 2.1, the reasoning of Theorem 1.1, applied to [7 shows that the set of Berge equilibrium 
points is nonempty. The proof is complete. | 
Let us now illustrate Theorem 3.2 by the following example. 
EXAMPLE 3.2. Consider the game of three players in which ui E [-1, 1] for i = 1,2, 3 
: 
_ 
: 
Let R1 = {1, 3}, R2 = {2}, S1 = {1}, $2 = {2, 3}. Then we have the following equalities: 
arg m~x(u-81) = {0}, 
arg max(u-s~) = {(0, 0)}, 
arg m3ax(u_s 1) = {0}. 
And thus, this game has an (S, R, 2)-system. In this game, 
0-1 (U) = Pr oj[2sl arg mlax(u_s 1) = {0}, 
0-2 (u) = Pr ojas2 arg max(u_ s2) = { (0, 0)}. 
Since 0-(~) = ~ if and only if ~ = (0, 0, 0) it holds that fi = (0, 0, 0) is a Berge equilibrium. 
It is clear that Example 3.2 is not amenable to Theorem 3.1, while Example 3.1 is not amenable 
to Theorem 2.1. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The results proved in this paper enlarge the Berge equilibria theory beyond the Radjef-type 
organization [1], and beyond what is proved in other works as well [4,5]. Existence theorems of 
Nash and Berge equilibria have been proved for a finite and infinite person games; also Theo- 
rem 1.1 does not require any restrictive assumption on the space of strategies uch as reflexivity 
or separability, and so it can be very useful in the theory of games. 
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